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Liberal Hegemony and US Foreign Policy 
under Barack Obama 
Peter Rudolf 
Looking back at the US foreign policy discourse since the end of the Cold War, it is 
striking how entrenched and dominant one basic assumption has been: the idea 
that the United States must remain the leading power in the international system. 
According to this conception, the United States is and should remain the guarantor of 
international stability. Despite all the debates that have taken place between liberal 
and conservative internationalists, US foreign policy ideology is still defined by an 
understanding of the US as “benign hegemon”, even though the term itself is hardly 
used. America’s leadership is believed to be benevolent in the sense that it is in the 
best interests not only of the US but also of most states worldwide. Yet in the current 
presidential race, for the first time since America’s rise to global leadership, a candi-
date is running under the slogan of “America First”— an attitude that marks a signifi-
cant break with the dominant hegemonic role conception. 
 
At the level of foreign policy discourse, 
“realists” in academia and in libertarian 
think tanks (notably the Cato Institute) 
have long advocated a grand strategy of 
selective engagement—but so far with little 
political resonance. At the political level, 
the populist Tea Party wing of the Republi-
can Party and, more importantly, Donald 
Trump as the party’s presidential candi-
date, tend toward instinctive semi-isola-
tionism—or to use a term coined by Walter 
Russell Mead, toward a “Jacksonian” foreign 
policy view, mixing the preference for a 
strong military with opposition to anything 
smacking of international liberalism in the 
Wilsonian tradition (Rathbun 2013). But the 
foreign policy “establishment” remains 
wedded to versions of the traditional hege-
monic role conception and to a “strategy 
of primacy” (Mastanduno 1997), apparently 
fearing the risks of retrenchment more 
than the costs of continued “deep engage-
ment” (Brooks/Ikenberry/Wohlforth 
2012/13). 
Here, two variants of a hegemonic for-
eign policy have been competing with each 
another. On the one hand, there is the 
unilateral, occasionally almost imperial 
foreign policy approach that finally took 
shape in the wake of September 11, 2001, 
but that had its roots in the debates of the 
1990s. On the other hand, there is the pre-
dominantly liberal internationalist, multi-
lateral approach to foreign policy. Both 
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approaches agree on maintaining American 
dominance in terms of material power re-
sources. Also, both approaches display a 
pronounced disposition toward the use of 
military force in the pursuit of a number of 
goals. Both are united in their perception 
of threats from illiberal regimes and failed 
states as well as from Islamist extremism. 
Both approaches share a globalist view of 
American interests and the conviction that 
the US should remain committed to and 
involved in all strategically important 
world regions. The two approaches differ, 
however, in the importance they ascribe 
to international legitimacy and, thus, to 
the role of multilateral institutions. 
There are three key functional precon-
ditions for the role of a liberal hegemon 
(Ikenberry 2001): 
 First, a preference for multilateral mech-
anisms, giving other states the oppor-
tunity to bring in their own interests and 
perspectives, and a willingness to obey 
the rules governing all members of mul-
tilateral institutions and to constructive-
ly build and develop such institutions. 
 Second, the provision of public goods 
from which other states can benefit. 
This essentially legitimizes the hege-
mon’s leadership role and increases the 
chances that other states will accept its 
role and the special responsibilities and 
privileges that are associated with it. 
Leadership in providing public goods 
entails the willingness to intervene mili-
tarily for the sake of the international 
order even if vital national interests are 
not directly affected.  
 Third, maintaining cooperative relations 
with other major powers, whose inter-
ests must be taken into account in order 
to reduce any incentives they might have 
to challenge the American-led interna-
tional order and alter the balance of 
power. 
Obviously, actual US foreign policy has 
never fully corresponded to this ideal type. 
Unilateral tendencies could already be 
observed during the Clinton administra-
tion, which understood US leadership in 
the sense of liberal hegemony. Unlike later 
under President George W. Bush, this ten-
dency was not the product of the adminis-
tration’s strategic orientation. Rather, it 
arose structurally through the strength-
ened role of Congress after the end of the 
Cold War. Congress turned out to be open 
to resistance from particularistic social and 
bureaucratic actors to increased multilat-
eral integration of American power (Thimm 
2016). And ideologically, Republicans in 
Congress were drawn toward a policy 
focused more on narrow national “great 
power” interests than on the imperatives 
of hegemonic leadership (Skidmore 2005).  
Yet the concept of the liberal hegemonic 
role remains present as a regulative ideal in 
the American self-image, and as such, also 
functions as a critical yardstick in assessing 
US foreign policy. Does this self-conception 
correspond with current political realities? 
Do operational policies live up to the stra-
tegic imperatives resulting from this role 
conception? These are the questions that 
guide the following analysis. As this can 
only be a brief attempt at addressing them, 
the analysis is confined to the level of what 
may be called the “grand strategic orienta-
tion.” This notion refers to the guiding 
principles of foreign policy, which are 
sometimes formulated explicitly in de-
claratory strategies, and sometimes only 
recognizable implicitly in operational 
policies. 
Obama’s grand strategic orientation 
The grand strategic orientation of the 
Obama administration can be interpreted 
as an attempt to reformulate and re-legiti-
mize US leadership by adapting it to a 
changing international system with a 
shifting distribution of power and influ-
ence among the major powers (Quinn 
2011). It is a strategic orientation sensitive 
to the costs of foreign interventions and to 
the difficulties of translating power into 
real influence through the use of military 
force in particular, which has proven to 
be both expensive and of limited value in 
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asymmetric conflicts.  The guiding assump-
tion seems to be that the United States is 
less hampered by a lack of material re-
sources than by the continuing challenge 
of re-legitimizing US leadership (Buzan 
2008). Indeed, in spite of its relative decline, 
the US position within the international 
system continues to be characterized by 
clear superiority in terms of the unique 
combination of hard—military, economic, 
and technological—power resources (Cox 
2012). But a hegemonic role transcends the 
use of brute power; it requires that other 
states accept the hegemonic leadership as 
legitimate. Clearly, at the declaratory level, 
but less so at the operational level, foreign 
policy under Obama has reflected the func-
tional logic of the hegemonic role concep-
tion (Ikenberry 2014; Rapkin/Braaten 2009).  
Restoring moral authority 
By distancing his administration from 
the worst excesses of the “war on terror,” 
Obama tried to restore a common basis of 
shared interests and values between the US 
and those countries that are expected to 
follow American leadership, especially 
the traditional US allies. The expectation 
seemed to be that a new, positive percep-
tion of the US would make it easier to mobi-
lize international support for US objectives. 
When he took office, Obama stated that 
over the course of the “global war on ter-
ror,” the US had undermined the values 
that had made the US strong. But his pledge 
to restore the moral authority of the US and 
thus one source of “soft power” was more 
difficult to translate into operational poli-
cies. There is no doubt that since that time, 
as Obama promised, interrogation methods 
have been limited to those outlined in the 
Army Field Manual and therefore within the 
limits set by the Geneva Conventions. Secret 
prisons have been shut down, with the ex-
ception of those where detainees were held 
temporarily on transition to other facilities. 
Rendition, a practice dating back to the 
Clinton years, has not been fully aban-
doned. And the promise to close Guantá-
namo ran into bipartisan Congressional 
opposition, which Obama did not dare to 
bypass through unilateral executive action. 
The Obama administration jettisoned the 
term “global war on terror”, but has not 
abandoned the war paradigm. The war 
against al-Qaida and so-called “associated 
forces” has continued, with the meaning 
of the term “associated forces” stretched 
to include almost any violent extremist 
Islamist group. The administration has 
argued that this “armed conflict” is not 
geographically confined, an assertion that 
is highly contentious under international 
law and not shared by many allies of the 
United States (McCrisken 2011). 
With these legitimizations as the context 
for US military operations, long-range, re-
mote-controlled, highly accurate combat 
drones have enabled a largely opaque 
institutionalized practice of more or less 
targeted killings to unfold within a grey 
zone of asymmetric conflicts. Drone war-
fare became the hallmark of Obama’s ver-
sion of the war on terror, which—despite 
murmurings even among US allies—has not 
received much public criticism and has also 
not significantly changed the overall posi-
tive international perception of Obama and 
his foreign policy (Wike/Stokes/Poushter 
2015). 
Multilateralism (if possible) 
President Obama promised to further 
develop institutional procedures embed-
ding the US in multilateral frameworks 
and allowing other states to have some 
influence on US policies. In Obama’s poli-
tical program, a stronger multilateral 
orientation—the term “multilateralism” is 
rarely used—has also meant calling allies to 
take on more responsibility and passing on 
costs to other states. In contrast to what 
initial pronouncements seemed to indicate, 
the Obama administration has not under-
taken any vigorous effort at adapting for-
mal institutions in order to anchor and 
socialize rising powers. Instead it prefers 
to use informal ad-hoc institutions, most 
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notably the Nuclear Security Summit held 
in April 2010 (Vezirgiannidou 2013). Pre-
serving freedom of action has remained a 
key feature of US foreign policy even under 
President Obama. With a Congress that is 
institutionally inclined towards unilateral-
ism and, particularly among Republicans, 
deeply averse to anything smacking of 
multilateralism, only a minimal instru-
mental multilateralism has been politically 
feasible (Skidmore 2012). As the Obama 
years have again shown: in US foreign poli-
cy, multilateralism is hardly more than 
instrumental, meaning that international 
institutions are useful as long as they help 
to reduce costs and lend legitimacy to US 
foreign policy actions, and as long as these 
institutions do not impose constraints on 
the United States. 
In the economic sphere, traditional 
multilateralism has given way to a form of 
what the administration calls “pragmatic 
multilateralism” (Froman 2015). With the 
Doha round of global trade talks having 
reached a standstill, the priority shifted to-
ward regional trade pacts. It is hard to say 
whether this shift was originally inspired 
by a geopolitical rationale or whether it 
was rather framed this way to shore up 
domestic support in light of the uncertain 
welfare gains and overall employment 
effects resulting from regional trade pacts.  
In effect, it meant a “return of geopolitics” 
and the prospect of competing trading 
blocs (Dieter 2014). For the United States, 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TTP) is seen 
as a way of countering Chinese hegemonic 
aspirations in Asia by denying China the 
political leverage over other Asian count-
ries in case they become too economically 
dependent on China. Together with the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP), it offers the US the prospect 
of preserving its leadership role in setting 
the ground rules of the international 
trading system (Green/Goodman 2016; 
Hamilton 2014). 
Providing collective goods 
The role of a global leader comes with both 
benefits and obligations: other states allow 
the leader to exercise greater influence, but 
expect it to provide collective goods. But a 
global leader can use its material resources 
to pursue national interests unilaterally 
(Cronin 2001). If it behaves as the US did 
under President George W. Bush, the 
foundations of its leadership role and the 
institutions through which it can legiti-
mately act as a leader will be undermined. 
US leadership under President Bush was 
strongly focused on, or indeed almost re-
duced to the “war on terror” (Kagan 2008). 
President Obama’s idea of leadership has 
transcended this conception. By trying to 
take on a leadership role in climate policy 
and in nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation policies, the Obama admin-
istration has sent a clear and positive signal 
to the international community. 
Assuming a leadership role in contribut-
ing to climate stability was a major chal-
lenge for Obama. The US Congress, con-
cerned about the costs, was opposed to any 
comprehensive climate change bill and 
any binding international agreement on 
reducing greenhouse gases. By resorting to 
politically controversial executive action, 
especially the new regulations based upon 
the Clean Air Act, Obama circumvented 
domestic opposition and proved that he 
was serious about changing the US position 
from blocking to leading. And by persuad-
ing China to agree to reduce its emissions, 
the Obama administration paved the way 
for the Paris Climate Agreement in Decem-
ber 2015. As a set of non-binding commit-
ments, the Paris agreement did not directly 
involve Congress. The agreement may fall 
short of the actions needed to effectively 
tackle climate change, but it represents the 
culmination of a long evolution in the US 
role in climate policy: a transformation 
from spoiler to leader (Sussman 2015). 
No less controversial domestically was 
Obama’s vision of a nuclear-weapons-free 
world. The New Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty (New START) remained the modest 
SWP Comments 40 
August 2016 
5 
first—and last—step toward this utopian 
goal. Reviving nuclear arms control with 
Russia undoubtedly had some value: Al-
though the relationship between the two 
countries soon began to deteriorate again, 
the treaty was implemented smoothly, with 
the transparency and verification measures 
probably acting as an antidote to potential 
miscalculation and worst-case assumptions 
in a climate of growing mistrust (Pifer 
2016). With Russia uninterested in further 
strategic nuclear cuts and with the role of 
nuclear forces in US security policy still not 
substantially reduced, as became clear in 
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the 
prospect of further, more ambitious nucle-
ar disarmament looked bleak. In 2013, a 
follow-up study to the NPR concluded that 
deployed strategic nuclear forces could be 
further reduced by no more than one-third 
in a new arms control treaty. Unilateral 
cuts were not envisioned by the Obama 
administration (Woolf 2015). Whether or 
not the US nuclear weapons modernization 
program launched by the administration 
actually undermined the administration’s 
2010 pledge not to develop or deploy new 
nuclear warheads remained the subject of 
controversy, even among former Obama 
administration officials. 
Cooperative relations with major powers 
If the United States wants to use interna-
tional institutions, especially the United 
Nations, in an instrumental way, then it 
must necessarily maintain a cooperative 
relationship with major powers that are 
not US allies. This holds true especially if 
US leadership is understood as akin to 
directing a “concert” of major powers, a 
conception that was implicit in the stra-
tegic vision of the early Obama administra-
tion. But the logic of a global “concert” 
implies that regional geopolitical rivalries 
can be managed and that they will not 
spin out of control as a result of regional 
counterbalancing (Kurth 2009). The classic 
instrument of mitigating geopolitical 
competition between major powers is the 
acceptance of “spheres of influence” (Hast 
2014). But in the US discourse, “spheres of 
influence” are rarely seen as a model for 
regional order that reduces the risk of 
war and acts as a precondition for global 
cooperation (Shapiro 2015). Rather, in the 
dominant narrative, granting a “sphere of 
influence” to another power is generally 
condemned as appeasement (Kagan 2015). 
Thus Russia’s and China’s claim to “spheres 
of influence” has posed a serious challenge 
to US foreign policy and has raised the 
question of whether the US should tacitly 
accept such spheres or deny them at high 
costs (Etzioni 2015). 
From the start, the Obama administra-
tion has placed a clear priority on “reset-
ting” relations with Russia that had dete-
riorated over the last years of the Bush 
administration and on establishing co-
operation on security issues. It hoped that 
by developing a comprehensive agenda for 
cooperation, Russia might be more forth-
coming on issues of utmost importance for 
the US foreign, especially nuclear arms con-
trol and nuclear nonproliferation (Deyer-
mond 2013). Even as US-Russian relations 
reached their low point in the wake of the 
Ukraine conflict, the Obama administra-
tion did not resort to a confrontational 
containment policy. Instead, it tried to walk 
a fine line: On the one hand, it reacted to 
the Russian annexation of Crimea by sup-
porting the Ukraine (but without lethal 
weapons), by imposing targeted economic 
sanctions, and by militarily reassuring 
NATO’s Eastern members; on the other 
hand, it tried to maintain the basis for co-
operation on global issues (Charap/Shapiro 
2015). 
Whereas Russia is perceived as a region-
al power ready to reassert its claim of a 
“sphere of influence” in the former Soviet 
space, managing the economic and military 
rise of the People’s Republic of China is 
seen as the major geopolitical challenge of 
the coming decades. The relationship 
between the US and China contains the 
ingredients for a geopolitical power rivalry: 
China has been expanding its economic 
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and military power, and its regional and 
global influence is growing, while the US 
is determined to remain an Asian-Pacific 
power and not to accept China’s regional 
hegemony. The Obama administration was 
able to build on the strategic framework for 
dealing with China that was established by 
the Bush administration with the aim of 
further integrating China into the inter-
national system and incorporating it as a 
constructive actor into a concert of great 
powers under US leadership. This strategy 
does not, however, assume that China’s rise 
will occur peacefully. Rather, it allows for 
the possibility that an antagonistic rivalry 
for hegemony will emerge. Political coop-
eration and economic integration were 
therefore pursued under the Bush admin-
istration through a notable increase in 
strategic hedging. Maintaining American 
military supremacy and expanding security 
relationships with states in the Asia-Pacific 
region had become central elements of this 
hedging by the end of the Bush administra-
tion. The Obama administration intensified 
these elements of the strategy, while at the 
same time trying to continue cooperative 
relations with China (Wolf 2014). 
Regional rebalancing 
Strengthening the US alliance system in the 
Asia-Pacific region, deepening relationships 
with rising powers in that area, becoming 
more involved in regional organizations, 
and, as already mentioned, deepening eco-
nomic integration through the TPP became 
the central features of the policy of re-
balancing towards the Pacific under Obama 
(Paul 2015). Over more than a decade, the 
arc of crisis in the broader Middle East, 
from North Africa to Pakistan, was the cen-
tral focus of US foreign policy, consuming 
significant attention and resources—too 
much attention and too many resources, 
as the Obama administration concluded in 
a very “realist” calculation of US interests.  
Thus, the basic thrust of Obama’s poli-
cies for that region soon became clear: They 
would aim at reducing the costs and bur-
dens of direct military involvement and at 
avoiding new commitments of this kind. 
Drones, bombs, Special Forces and proxy 
fighters (such as the Kurds in the fight 
against ISIS) would take the place of “boots 
on the ground,” counterinsurgency, and 
nation-building.  In a nutshell, that is the 
line President Obama has maintained, even 
in the case of Syria, unfazed by the chorus 
of critics demanding more involvement, 
either to demonstrate greater resolve or for 
humanitarian reasons (Krieg 2016). With 
the exceptions of several failed efforts at 
reviving the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Talks 
and of the successful Iranian nuclear talks, 
the Obama administration has basically 
refrained from playing a leadership role in 
the Middle East, remaining primarily re-
active and avoiding costly commitments 
(Gerges 2013). Although wedded to the 
hegemonic role, the Obama administration 
has distinguished clearly between what it 
sees as core regions and issues on the one 
hand and more peripheral regions and 
issues on the other (Rose 2015). The next 
US administration, if led by Hillary Clinton, 
might have a less differentiated view—but 
at the risk of overestimating the potential 
influence and leverage the US can exert on 
a number of developments. 
Conclusions 
Obama’s strategic orientation has reflected 
the functional logic of liberal hegemony 
to a large extent, perhaps as much as was 
possible given the domestic constraints and 
structural bias of US foreign policy towards 
unilateralism. The US Congress is skeptical 
of and often opposed to any embedding of 
foreign policy decisions into multilateral 
institutions that could diminish its influ-
ence. Congress not only sets severe limits 
on US multilateralism; it has indeed be-
come a driving force of unilateralism. If 
there is one major issue on which Congress 
acts in a bipartisan spirit, it is on economic 
sanctions (Tama 2014). Congress has been 
the main driver of US sanctions policy, of-
ten trying to bind the hands of presidents. 
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The result is a certain amount of unilateral-
ism resulting from the extraterritorial 
reach of major sanction laws. 
But this unilateral temptation is not con-
fined to Congress. The Treasury Depart-
ment has intensified and refined the use 
of so-called secondary sanctions, especially 
financial sanctions based on the central 
role of the US dollar in the international 
financial system (Lohmann 2014). The 
question of unilateral US sanctions could 
emerge as a highly controversial issue 
under the next administration if the US 
embraced a full-fledged containment policy 
against Russia or if the Western world 
became divided over efforts to manage 
China’s rise. With the re-emergence of great 
power rivalries, US foreign policy is con-
fronted with new challenges. Future histo-
rians might look back at the Obama era as 
the zenith of liberal internationalism and 
its vision of benign hegemony. 
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